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Abstract This paper introduces pictorial intelligent system
for human identification (PiSHi), an image-based captcha
which uses three human cognitive abilities to distinguish
humans frommachines. Thefirst is the humanability to easily
recognise the image’s upright orientation. The second is the
human brain’s ability in recognising a picture’s content when
it is only partially visible. And the third is the human ability
in unconscious decision making when encountering pictorial
challenges. This work models such complicated human pat-
terns in problem solving for the first time. In order to extract
these behavioural patterns and save them in a pattern data-
base, we have implemented our own captcha and performed
a series of experiments. PiSHi’s interface presents the user
with a set of distorted pictures and asks her to click on the
upright orientation of all the pictures in any preferred order.
Next, it captures the user’s interaction patterns, compares
them with the ones saved in the pattern database, and grants
her a corresponding credit. Based on this credit, the user
either passes or fails the test, and participates in updating
the picture database. Our experiments indicate that human
users can solve our proposed captcha effectively—with an
accuracy of 99.44%. Besides, our proposed system is secure
B Maryam Mehrnezhad
m.mehrnezhad@ncl.ac.uk
Abbas Ghaemi Bafghi
ghaemib@um.ac.ir
Ahad Harati
a.harati@um.ac.ir
Ehsan Toreini
ehsan.toreini@ncl.ac.uk
1 School of Computing Science, Newcastle University,
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
2 Computer Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad,
Mashhad, Iran
against several types of attacks including random guessing
and reverse image search engines. The results offer the pos-
sibility of utilising the identified human behavioural models
in practical captchas.
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1 Introduction
Freeweb services are increasingly used bymany users every-
day. This attracts more attention to the problem of misuse
through automated soft bots and makes it essential to dis-
tinguish between a human user and a machine. Completely
automated public turing test to tell computer and humans
apart (CAPTCHA1) offers a way to make such a distinction.
Captcha is an extended version of the Turing Test, aka a sec-
ondary authentication mechanism.
The first captcha was a text-based one, designed for the
Yahoo website [22] in 2000. A text-based captcha asks the
user to distinguish, and type a set of characters presented in
the context of a noisy image. Text-based captchas are popular
since they are easy to design and implement. However, the
distorted noisy images are sometimes too complex for human
users [6]. Moreover, it has been shown that even the most
difficult variants of distorted text can be solved with 99.8%
accuracy by advanced methods [20].
Alternatively, other multimedia elements such as image,
voice, and video have been proposed in the literature to be
utilised in captcha solutions [1,4,11,14,16,18]. Multimedia
captchas are simple, attractive, and fun for human users.
Besides, it is harder for machines to distinguish such ele-
1 We use captcha instead of its original form (CAPTCHA) for conve-
nience.
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ments compared to text. In particular, image-based captchas
(image captchas) have been widely proposed by different
researchers, and even commercialised by some companies.
For example, Google upgraded its text-based reCAPTCHA
ver 1.0 to an image-based one, reCAPTCHA ver 2.0 with a
free API, in 2014 [20].
1.1 Image-based captchas
There aremany different image captchas, all ofwhich present
the users with a set of pictures from the captcha database.
Many of the older image captchas were based on limited
image databases which store a few number of pictures along
with their labels (tags). This approach, however, suffers from
a few security issues. For example, the limited size of the
database enables the attacker to learn the whole database
after a while, and then access the system. Besides in order to
grantee the security of such a design, the picture databases
and the tags need to be kept private which is against the
Kerckhoffs’s principle, which states that a security system
should remain secure even if all algorithms and databases
are public [14].
Some other solutions suggest the inclusion of semantics
in image captchas. Semantics are the human’s abilities in
recognising some particular subjects in the pictures. Exam-
ples include face recognition [19] and animal recognition
[4]. Most of these solutions, however, have the same data-
base problem. In addition, machine learning algorithms are
pretty successful in the recognition of specific items such as
human faces [17] or animal species [10].
More recent and advanced captchas suggest to the use
of more complicated semantics such as image orientation.
Almost all people learn basic concepts such as up and down,
close and far, beauty and ugliness, etc. at a very young age.
However, such concepts cannot be easily learned by auto-
mated programmes. To the best of our knowledge, image
orientation (to be more specifically, the top part of an image)
is the only concept that has been applied in a few captchas
[11,16,18]. The image orientation concept is label-free, i.e.
the captcha does not need to save any matching labels for
the pictures as the answers in the database. The reason is that
almost all images are normally in the correct orientation. This
unique property improves the captcha security significantly.
In this work, we utilise the concept of picture orientation
differently. Instead of relying on the user’s correct recogni-
tion of the top part of the picture, we focus on the interaction
model that the user unconsciously follows to complete the
challenge, as explained in the next subsections in detail.
1.2 Motivation
What discriminates a captcha from other security systems is
the human’s strong role in the process. In fact, captcha sys-
tems are supposed to be built based on human capabilities.
Most image captchas that have been developed to date are
based on human recognition abilities (such as face, animal,
top part of an image). We believe that there are other human
abilities which have not been explored by the researchers
in the field. For instance, one of the most natural human
properties is being error-proneness. It’s said that ’to err is
human’.AsAndersondiscusses it in hisSecurityEngineering
book: “error research confirms this: the predictable varieties
of human error are rooted in the very nature of cognition” [3].
This property has not been noticed directly in captcha designs
to date. Most captchas do not accept human errors in their
systems, i.e. a complete correct answer is required. However,
a few have applied different policies such as accepting partial
correct answers [1,4,7,16]. In PiSHi, we rely neither on com-
plete nor on partial correct answer strategies. We propose a
new method which grants users associated credits based on
their natural reactions—including errors—when solving a
pictorial problem.
People have unique capabilities in problem solving. They
have specific behavioural models for perceiving and answer-
ing image captchas. In this paper, we ask our users to solve
an image captcha, and we analyse the user’s entire engage-
ment with the system. The problem presented to the users is
the recognition of the upside part of multiple pictures, which
are partially presented in the page. Hence, we also include
another human brain’s ability which is its strength in rebuild-
ing thewhole content of the picture by only seeing some parts
of it. For example, if a user sees an ear of an elephant, he can
build the whole picture in his mind, and recognise the sub-
ject. For partial presentation of pictures, a captcha system can
simply cut some parts of the picture randomly and present it
to the user. However, a more usable and secure approach is
to use some advanced transformations. Therefore, we distort
original pictures by applying geometric transformations (see
Fig. 3), as suggested in Multiple Seimcha [16].
The hypothesis of this paper is that when users are asked
to click on the upside part of a set of distorted images (like
in Fig. 1), they tend to click on the easier ones first and
with higher accuracy compared to the harder ones. By eas-
Fig. 1 PiSHi asks the user to click on the upright orientation of 10
distorted pictures. Eight of these pictures are for evaluating the user
and have different hardness rates to be clicked correctly. The other two
pictures are under observation of multiple users to be chosen in order
to update the captcha database
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ier pictures, we mean those that whose contents are more
recognisable by the users. These sorts of patterned human
interactions with pictorial systems have not been applied in
captchas so far, and are the focus of this paper. Hence, the
research questions are: (a) to test if it is possible to model
human users’ behaviour in terms of interaction patterns with
our image captcha, and (b) to find out if it is feasible to use the
extracted patterns as the core of an image captcha In order to
observe our research questions we designed, implemented,
and evaluated a prototype of the proposed system. The main
contributions of this paper are:
1. We propose “PiSHi” as a new solution to distinguish
between human and bots. PiSHi grants a user a credit
basedonhis interactionwith the system.This credit deter-
mines whether he passes or fails, and what impact he
has on updating the database. Our captcha is the first
that includes human behavioural interaction patterns in
its design.
2. We present a proof-of-concept implementation of PiSHi.
We conducted user studies to evaluate the usability of our
system. Experiments confirmed that the extracted human
interaction patterns effectively distinguish between the
human users and the bots.
3. We present a security analysis of our proposed captcha
including estimating the chance of random guessing
attacks, and the results of reverse image search engines.
The results show that the proposed system is effectively
secure against such attacks.
Furthermore, we propose complexity metrics to be consid-
ered as a new category of captchametrics.We evaluate PiSHi
by presenting different metrics and compare themwith exist-
ing research.
1.3 Captcha metrics
The following properties are commonly suggested in the lit-
erature for evaluating a captcha; automation, open algorithms
and databases, usability, and security [14]. It is assumed that
the first two properties are provided by most strong and
commercial captchas. Based on this assumption, different
works evaluate their proposed captchas by presenting usabil-
ity studies as well as security analysis. However, there is
no standard framework for captcha evaluation, and different
approaches have been adapted in the literature. On the other
hand, captchas areweb-based systems, and different users are
frequently connecting to the servers simultaneously. Hence,
we believe that their scalability should be evaluated too.
Accordingly, we suggest to add complexity factors as a new
category of captcha metrics. Following this addition, captcha
metrics can be categorised into three different groups: usabil-
ity, security and complexity.
Usability Usability pertains to those features which deal
with user aspects of the system such as success rate, response
time, and response mechanism. Success rate or response rate
estimates the ratio of the cases that an average human user is
successful in solving the captcha challenges. Response time
is the time that an average human user spends on a captcha
sample, regardless of the result, which could be either pass
or fail. And response mechanism refers to the action that the
user is required to take in order to interact with the captcha,
e.g. clicking, typing, etc.
Security Security metrics relate to possible attacks on
captcha systems, i.e. the probability of an automatic pro-
gramme succeeding in passing the challenges. In general,
we can categorise the security attacks on image captchas
into three different groups: random guessing, direct match-
ing, and machine learning attacks. Random guessing is the
situation when an attacker randomly passes the captcha chal-
lenges without any effort, e.g. when a bot randomly clicks
on the pictures correctly. Direct matching refers to the con-
dition that an attacker solves the captcha by searching for
the answer in a lookup table. It is possible to construct the
lookup table by stealing the image database, or by mechan-
ical Turk attack [18]. And finally, machine learning attacks
try to learn the captcha images in the way that a human user
does. These attacks generally use different types of advanced
machine learning algorithms to break the captcha [10,23]. It
is not straightforward to analyse the strength of a picture
captcha against machine learning attacks since there are dif-
ferent techniques for image learning, and also they should be
customised depending on each captcha.
Alternative to customised machine learning attacks, many
works present the results of reverse image search engines
in matching their suggested distorted pictures with original
ones available in the web [15]. There are many differ-
ent reverse image search engines including Yanex,2 Karma
Decay,3 Rev IMG,4 ImgSeek,5 Google image search,6 and
Tineye.7 Unfortunately, most of these search engines do not
disclose their exact technical details such as feature selec-
tions, or learning algorithms. However, we roughly know
that all reverse image search engines use advanced CBIR
(content-based image retrieval) methods as a part of their
systems [2]. They produce image fingerprints and use differ-
ent machine learning algorithms in order to find the possible
2 www.yandex.com/images/.
3 http://karmadecay.com/.
4 www.revimg.com/.
5 http://sourceforge.net/projects/imgseek/.
6 www.google.com/imghp.
7 http://tineye.com/.
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matches in their databases. Hence, attacks based on reverse
image search engines could be considered in the category of
machine learning attacks.
ComplexityAsmentioned earlier, since captchas are web
applications, they are frequently used by different users
simultaneously. Hence for a practical captcha, a few scal-
ability constraints should be considered in the design. We
suggest three important factors to be evaluated for a practi-
cal captcha; (a) server complexity, (b) client complexity, and
(c) communication complexity. Server complexity presents
the complexity of the algorithms in the server side includ-
ing producing a challenge and evaluating a response. Client
complexity is based on the necessity of using any particular
software or settings in the client side. And communication
complexity is the amount of the data being communicated
between the client and the server. These issues have been
considered in few related works such as Sketcha [18], but
have not been mentioned as captcha metrics. Thus, they are
proposed here as a new category of captcha metrics and are
referred to as complexity metrics.
2 PiSHi overview and initial configuration
Here, we review our proposed system, and we present the
preprocessing steps and its initial settings.
2.1 Overview
We propose pictorial intelligent system for human identifica-
tion (PiSHi) as a new image captcha. PiSHi mainly relies on
modelling human abilities in decision-making when answer-
ing image-based challenges. Human users have complicated
patterns when they interact with computerised pictorial sys-
tems. However, before any pattern extraction and building
the corresponding models, it is necessary to find appropriate
challenges for the users to solve. In PiSHi, we utilise two
challenges: (a) the identification of the upright orientation of
an image and (b) the recognition of the image content by see-
ing it partially. Both challenges are easy for human users and
hard for automated programmes to solve. In the preprocess-
ing phase, we use geometric transformations and random
rotations to partially present the pictures to the users to click
on the upright part of it. We also estimate the difficulty of
user identification after distorting the original pictures and
define it as hardness rate.
Combiningmultiple ideas asmentioned above gives us the
opportunity to model the behaviour of human users. PiSHi
distinguishes human users according to their particular pat-
terned decisions which they make without even being aware
of them. These decisions could be either right or wrong in
terms of clicking the upright part of the pictures correctly.We
extract our patterns in such a way that human users would
Image selector
from databases
PiSHi’s
inference engine
Image selector
from the web
Transformer
functions
User PC
Pattern
database
Main
picture
database
Temporary
picture
database
Fig. 2 PiSHi’s component diagram
benefit not only from their correct answers, but also from
their natural wrong ones. We consider these decisions as
interaction patterns, and extract and evaluate them by using
experimental data sets. We have performed our experiments
by asking volunteer users to participate in the study. We
logged 155 different records for the training data set, and
180 new records for the test data set.
We implemented a prototype of PiSHi as a proof of con-
cept and evaluated it with real-world data from human users.
This prototype was implemented as a web application using
ASP.Net. Geometric transformations were implemented in
Matlab and all images were saved in a file locally. Other
information about images was saved in an Access database
along with the details of the users’ interactions with the sys-
tem. All experiments were done locally on a laptop.
PiSHi shows 10 distorted images to the users: eight images
for evaluating users and two images for updating the data-
base (Fig. 1). These pictures are randomly presented in the
page. The user should click on the top of all images to com-
plete the challenge. The system then calculates the user’s
credit by comparing this behaviour with the extracted pat-
terns. Based on this credit, PiSHi either passes or fails the
user, and also updates the picture database. Figure 2 shows
the system’s component diagram. We will present different
aspects of PiSHi by building different parts of this component
diagram gradually.
2.2 Original and distorted pictures
We downloaded 30 different pictures from the internet
with different subjects (Apple, Baby, Badminton ball, Bike,
Birds, Books, Building, Camel, Car, Cat, Dolphins, Elephant,
Flower, Fish, Frog, Hamster, Horses, Lighthouse, Oranges,
Panda, Plane, Penguins, Peacock, Rose, Swans, Spiderman,
Ship, Trees, Tom & Jerry, and Zebra), as shown in Fig.
5. Then, we applied a few distortions to obtain the out-
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cylinder(2 + cos(t)) cylinder(2 + sin(t)) cylinder(1.5 + sin(t), 40) cylinder(t)
Fig. 3 Geometric functions and their corresponding 3D objects
put samples. The distortions include 2D rotations, geometric
transformations, and 3D rotations. For the 2D rotations, we
randomly chose an angle (0, 360) and rotated the pictures.
In order to avoid white margins in the rotated pictures, we
zoomed and cut some parts of them by using ROIrotate
function in Matlab [5]. Next, we applied geometric transfor-
mations and generated six 3Dobjects of each original picture.
We used a few simple Matlab functions such as sphere and
cylinder with different settings in order to produce the 3D
objects, as demonstrated in Fig. 3. In the final step, we ran-
domly chose an angle in 3D space to capture a 2D picture
from each 3D object using Azimuth and Elevation settings
in Matlab. Elevation was set in the range of [−50◦, 50◦] to
avoid producing unusable picture. We repeated this process
four times and ended up with 24 different distorted pictures
for each original picture and saved them into a file.
In order to study the effect of the suggested transfor-
mations, we asked 24 volunteer users (male and female,
18–40years old, university and non-university people) to
identify the subject of the distorted pictures from a list of
30 labels (Apple, Baby, Badminton ball, Bike, etc.). We ran-
domly chose a distorted picture and showed it to the user in
a web page along with a list of labels, and repeated it for 60
rounds. We programmed the system in a way that it showed
all distorted versions distributively to different users; hence,
each 3D model was seen 240 times in total. In addition, 48
different distorted images were shown to the users per each
original picture. Our users could identify the content of the
pictures in 87% of the cases in about 7.5 s on average. We
studied the pictures that the users failed to recognise, and
found they were randomly distributed between the original
images and the selected 3D models. These results show that
the selected transformations are effective and usable for the
users.
2.3 Hardness rate
In this phase, we studied the effect of the suggested trans-
formations on the identification of the top part of the
picture. Following Multiple SEIMCHA’s approach [16], a
key image—coloured black in the top one third— was trans-
formed with the original image simultaneously, as shown in
Fig. 4. This key image was in charge of retaining the top
of the picture, as the right answer area, in the transformed
version. We asked 20 volunteer users (male and female, 18–
30years old, university students and staff) to click on the top
Fig. 4 Examples of the original and key pictures, and their distorted
versions
part of the pictures to find the associated average identifica-
tion rates. We presented them with a simple web application
showing a single distorted image in the page in each step.
Then, we asked them to click next to see another picture.
We showed 60 different distorted images (two distorted pic-
tures per each original one, evenly chosen from our set of 3D
objects) to all users. Therefore, 40 distorted images were pre-
sented to the users per each original picture. We calculated
the identification rates of the original pictures based on the
average identification rates of their corresponding distorted
versions. We used these average identification rates of the
original pictures in order to define the hardness rates.
Following the same rules in [16], if the identification rate
was less than 60%, the original image was rejected. Other-
wise, we assigned the same identification rate as the picture’s
hardness rate (HR). Next, we put them in four different HR
categories; Simple (90–100%), Medium (80–90%), Hard
(70–80%), andVeryHard (60–70%). S,M,H, andV will rep-
resent these four groups, respectively, in the rest of this paper.
Figure 5 shows the original pictures categorised according to
their HRs. As it can be seen among the 30 initial pictures, five
pictures were rejected due to their low recognition rates, and
the rest are roughly distributed among all different difficulty
groups. After analysing the rejected pictures and asking for
users feedback, we found that these pictures had multiple top
areas distributed in different parts of the picture. For exam-
ple in one of the rejected pictures, there are four different
badminton balls and their top parts are started from about the
middle part of the picture to the very upper part of it. Hence,
users had difficulties in recognising the upside orientation
correctly.
To this end, some parts of PiSHi’s component diagram
have been built in the preprocessing phase.Main image data-
base is the primary database which includes the original
versions of the images along with their HRs. This database
gets updated with new images, as we will present in Sect. 4.
The Image selector algorithm picks pictures from each cate-
gory of difficulty (S, M, H and V ) from the main database to
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Fig. 5 Original pictures categorised according to their hardness rates
be distorted and shown to the user. This algorithm randomly
includes non-redundant and equal number of pictures from
each category (two of each category). Transformer functions
include rotation algorithms and geometric transformations
with multiple runtime random values for different variables.
Now, we are able to present the preprocessed pictures to the
users and log their interaction with the system. Based on
these interactions, we build the corresponding patterns, and
use them in PiSHi’s inference engine as explained in the next
section.
3 Patterns and inference engine
In this section, first we present the data collection process for
our training set, next we describe our suggested patterns, and
finally we present our proposed inference engine to be used
in PiSHi.
3.1 Data collection for training
We performed an experiment in order to collect experimental
data for our training data set. This data set was used in order
to extract users behaviour models, and to build the pattern
database component. We asked 31 different users (male and
female, 22–30year old, university student and staff) to take
part in this experiment. We presented each user with a web
page including eight distorted pictures from different cate-
gories of difficulties. We asked each user to click on the top
part of each of the pictures in any order that they preferred.
We repeated the experiment five times for all users; hence,
we had 155 different records at the end. Users interactions
with the system were logged for further analysis.
Users were presented with the following instruction at the
top of the page: “Please click on the top part of the subject
of each picture”. A video guide was also prepared as a help
document which users could click through.We also included
an extra round for each user as a practice phase and did not
log that. In order to improve the study, some of the users were
asked to say aloud what they thought of the interaction with
the system, or to answer the test by talking to a friend (pair
work) instead of working individually [12]. Almost all users
found it easy to understand the system on their first try. There
was, however, one user, who had a previous mental model
of Sketcha [18], and he first thought he needed to click the
images to rotate them.
3.2 Extracting interaction patterns
We studied the training data set and extracted five different
patterns based on the possibility of the occurrence of spe-
cific sequences. We analysed and modelled some particular
patterns in the form of probability distribution functions. We
extracted the five following patterns from our train set, and
used them in PiSHi: success rate based on the number of
correct answers, success rate based on hardness rate (HR),
click order based on HR, success rate of each click based
on HR, and response time. In the upcoming subsections, we
explain each pattern by including figures and examples. Note
that some of the suggested patterns are complicated, and take
time to follow.
3.2.1 PNo: Success rate based on the number of correct
answers
One of the most important factors to decide to pass or fail
the user is the number of the correct clicked images. Since a
PiSHi’s sample challenge includes images of different diffi-
culty levels, it is expected that an average user clicks on some
of the pictures wrongly. In other words, we do not expect the
users to click all images correctly, instead we will give them
credit if they err according to the extracted patterns. Figure
6 shows the probability distribution of the number of users
based on the correct clicked images.
We define PNo as the probability distribution function of
this pattern. As can be seen in Fig. 6, if a user clicks of seven
images correctly, she gets PNo(7) = 0.335 as her credit,
which is the highest credit in this pattern. However, it is not
fair to a userwho has clicked eight correct images to gain less.
Hence, we slightly modify this function to assign PNo(7) to
eight correct images too.
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Fig. 6 PNo: Success rate based on the number of correct answers
3.2.2 PH R-No: Success rate based on HR
The second proposed pattern is the success rate based on
hardness rate. The aim here is to discover howmany of S, M,
H, and V images are correctly identifiable by human users.
We already know that simpler images will be answered more
correctly in comparison with hard ones (that is where the
definition of hardness rate comes from). Here, we want to
model users’ behaviour when they are presented with a set
of pictures from different categories of difficulties.
Figure 7 shows five different categories of possible
sequences in this pattern. The labels on the x axis start with
the number of right answers and continue with the type of
wrongly clicked images. For example, the labels which start
with 7 present the condition that seven images are correctly
clicked. The incorrectly clicked image could be either S, M,
H, or V, represented as 7-S, 7-M, 7-H, and 7-V, respectively.
This pattern could be considered as a conditional probability
function based on the first pattern (P1).
Categories of 7 and 6 present all their possible cases,
while the others only show the more probable ones. The
cases with the probability of zero in the experimental data
set are presented by the postfix of others in this figure. Cat-
egories 8, 3, 2, and 1 are not shown in Fig. 7 since the first
has the probability of 1, and the others rarely occurred in our
experiment. If the cases that have not happened in the train-
ing experiment happen in the test experiment, PiSHi will
grant them the minimum nonzero credit of this pattern. Let
PH R-No denote the probability distribution function of this
pattern. As an example, if a user clicks 6 pictures correctly
and two V images wrongly, PiSHi grants her the credit of
PH R-No(6 − V V ) = 0.28 in this pattern.
3.2.3 PCli-Order : Click order based on HR
The third suggested pattern presents the users’ preferable
orders of their clicks based on pictures HRs, regardless of the
answer —correct or wrong. The idea here is to find out if the
users select simpler images earlier in comparisonwith harder
ones. For example, a possible click order is SMHVSMHV,
i.e. the user chooses to click on a simple picture first (either
correct or wrong), next he clicks on a medium picture, and
then a hard one, and so on.
There are different possible click orders, some of which
are very rare and did not appear in our training data set.
Therefore, we narrow them down to a subset of the more
common ones by considering the first four clicked images,
and disregarding the rest. We also do not consider in what
order each picture has been opted by the user in these four
clicks. In other words, we only observe if some particular
click sequences has been seen in the first four clicks or not.
Based on this suggestion, the total possible click orders are
reduced to 19 as presented below:
• If there are no pair images from the same category of HR,
there would be only one case (SMHV). As mentioned,
it is not important if the user clicks the S image first,
second, third, or last. Thus, SMHV is the representative
Fig. 7 PH R-No: Success rate based on HR
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of 23 other sequences too (substitutions of S, M, H, and
V inside the SMHV trace).
• If there is only one pair from the same category of
HR, there would be 4 × 3 = 12 cases (SSMH,
SSMV, SSHV,MMSH,MMSV,MMHV,HHSM,HHSV,
HHMV, VVSM, VVSH, and VVMH)
• And, if there are two pairs of the same category of HR,
therewould be six cases (SSMM,SSHH, SSVV,MMHH,
MMVV, and HHVV)
Figure 8 shows the probability of all these cases in our experi-
mental data set in descending order. The x axis labels present
the pictures which have been clicked in the first four clicks.
Let PCli-Order define the probability distribution of this pat-
tern. As an example, if a user selects a medium image first,
then a simple picture, and next two hard images, she gets
PCli-Order (SMH H) = 0.0581 as her credit.
As it can be seen from Fig. 8, users tend to select sim-
pler images in the earlier clicks, and subsequently harder
ones in the later clicks. Besides, we already know that users
click simpler pictures more correctly than hard ones. These
two separate facts could be seen as a rational proof of our
hypothesis that users would unconsciously respond to sim-
pler images faster and more accurately. We also present the
combination of these two facts in the form of a new pattern
in the next subsection.
3.2.4 PF-Pos-H R: Success rate of each click based on HR
The fourth pattern is the probability of each click’s HR in
combination with the probability of being clicked correctly.
As mentioned before, this pattern be considered as a con-
ditional probability function combined with the previous
pattern. In order to present this pattern, eight different prob-
ability distribution functions are needed to show each click
separately. Figure 9 shows these distributions. The x axis
represents two different levels of information. The first level
shows the click number and each click contains four (S, M,
H, and V) double beams. The green and red beams show the
possibility of right and wrong clicks, respectively. We define
eight different functions, PPos-H R1 to PPos-H R8 for click no.
1 to click no. 8. As an example, if the user clicks the images
according to the following scenario, her credit is as below 8:
• Click 1: M, right; PPos-H R1(M-Pass) = 0.19
• Click 2: V, wrong; PPos-H R2(V -Fail) = 0.03
• Click 3: S, right; PPos-H R3(S-Pass) = 0.19
• Click 4: S, right; PPos-H R4(S-Pass) = 0.21
• Click 5: H, right; PPos-H R5(H -Pass) = 0.05
• Click 6: M, wrong; PPos-H R6(M-Fail) = 0.03
• Click 7: V, right; PPos-H R7(V -Pass) = 0.18
• Click 8: H, wrong; PPos-H R8(H -Fail) = 0.05
Since these eight different credits are in the similar genre,
we convert them to one credit. Different approaches such
as addition, max or min selection, arithmetic or geometric
mean could be applied. Rationally, maximum or minimum
selection impair the impact of the rest. Thus, we suggest
applying a geometric mean function to calculate the final
credit in this pattern, PF-Pos-H R , by Eq. 1:
PF-Pos-H R = 8
√
PPos-H Ri (1)
where i is the click number, and varies from 1 to 8. Therefore,
for the mentioned example
PF-Pos-H R = 0.086. Figure 9 illustrates that the possibility
of correct answers decreases from the first click to the last one
(the first four clicks are correct with the average possibility
of around 85%, while it is less than 70% for the second
four clicks). Moreover, it can be seen that the simple pictures
have greater shares in the early clicks, and the harder ones
appear more in the later clicks. This observation confirms our
hypothesis.
3.2.5 PT : Response time
The final pattern is the distribution of the total response
time. The proposed captcha takes different times for differ-
ent users; the probability distribution is shown in Fig. 10. We
use the average of these values as the average response time
(see Sect. 5.2). PT is defined according to the probability
distribution up to 60s. For example, if it takes 19s for a user
to complete a test, the system would grant him the credit of
0.05 in this pattern.
8 Note that the numbers are rounded up for convenience, but were con-
sidered with five decimal point accuracy in the calculations.
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Fig. 9 PF-Pos-H R : Success rate of each click based on HR
Fig. 10 PT : Success rate based on time
3.3 Inference engine
The suggested patterns lead to five different probability dis-
tribution functions. Note that the eight functions presented
for the forth factor (P4) were converted to one function by
geometric mean function. We apply the same approach to
calculate the user’s final credit (CFinal ) in Eq. 2:
CFinal
= 5
√
PNo × PH R-No × PCli-order × PF-Pos-H R × PT
C
(2)
where C is a constant which is calculated by the multiplica-
tions of the highest credits of our users in each pattern in our
experiments (C = max(Px ), where Px is the credit in the
respective pattern).
As an example, consider a human userwith the probability
values as presented in the second column of Table 1. The
maximum values of our probability functions from Figs. 6,
7, 8, 9 and 10 are presented in the third column. Note that
for pattern no. 4, we use the average of the maximum values
of eight clicks to calculate C . As presented in the table, the
final credit of this user is equal to 0.716.
In order to observe the functionality of our suggested
credit system, we performed a manual test. We intention-
Table 1 Final credit estimation for a sample human user
Px Value Max value of pattern
PNo 0.322 0.335
PH R-No 0.481 0.481
PCli-order 0.148 0.155
PF-Pos-H R 0.086 0.316 (ave. of maxs of 8 clicks)
PT 0.100 0.133
CFinal = 5
√
Px
C = 0.716 C = max(Px ) = 0.001
ally provided random answers to a few PiSHi tests. Then,
we compared the given credits in each pattern, as well as the
final credits with our rational expectations.We found out that
the output of the proposed functions matched the expected
results. Please see “Appendix” for the details of our experi-
ments for simulating random guessing tests.
4 Updating the database
Updating a captcha’s picture database improves both the
security andusability aspects of the system. It diminishes sev-
eral kinds of attacks by replacing the old images by new ones.
We propose a new method for updating the database based
on user’s credits, which we call the credit-based approach. In
this approach, the more credit the user gets, the more impact
he has on updating the database. In our system, we have two
picture databases: the temporary database and the main data-
base (Fig. 2). The temporary database contains the pictures
which are under the observation of the users to be either added
to the main database or removed from the system. We pro-
posePiSHi’s interface contain 10 images: eight for evaluating
the user and two for updating the database. Our credit-based
method multiplies the user’s final credit by his answer for
the new picture, where it assigns 1 for a correct answer and
−1 for a wrong one. Then, PiSHi’s inference engine adds all
the users’ answers to each other to find out whether the new
picture is accepted (and to which HR category it belongs to),
or rejected.
In order to evaluate our credit-based idea, we downloaded
40 new images from featured photographs of Picasa web
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Fig. 11 Pictures in the temporary database categorised based on the
credit-based approach
albums.9 These pictureswere completely random, andwedid
not knowanything about their contents.We inserted them into
our temporary image database in order to evaluate them dur-
ing our final experiments (see Sect. 5.1 for details) through
180 different tests. We estimated hardness rates of all new
images based on two different approaches: simple counting
(accepting or rejecting the pictures based on counting the
number of correct answers) and credit based. Figure 11 shows
the categorised pictures based the credit-based approach.
We analysed the results in two ways: manually and exper-
imentally. The findings of our manual analysis show that
the credit-based approach sorts the new images better. For
example, the dandelion picture which was rejected by the
credit-based algorithm was categorised as M in the simple
counting method. However, it is an ambiguous round-shape
subject which makes it challenging for users to recognise its
top part. For experimental evaluation, we performed another
experiment in which we showed the distorted versions of all
40 pictures in five rounds to 10 new users (each original pic-
ture was seen 50 times). In order to evaluate the performance
of our approach, we only showed one picture per page in each
round. The pictures’ identification rates in this experiment
were very close to the results of the credit-based method,
while theywere different from the results of the simple count-
ing approach.
Apart from the good performance of the credit-based
method, it also categorises the pictures faster, i.e. it needs
less users to make a decision about a new picture since it
9 http://picasaweb.google.com/lh/explore.
increases the impact of the good voters. Another advantage
of this approach is that it alleviates the impact of random
guessing on new images since a random guessing attacker
will not get enough credit to vote.
As it can be seen in Fig. 11, since we did not apply any
filter when selecting the new pictures for the temporary data-
base, the H, V, and rejected pictures are more than the S
and M ones. In order to set a proper frequency for updating
the captcha database, we need to consider the category with
slower updating speed. This speed would change based on
the web source that we use for new pictures. New images can
be included from different sources by using Image selector
from the web component as presented in Fig. 2. While social
network websites such as Flickr.com might raise copyright
issues, free websites for public domain images such as wiki-
media.org will not. Such free services are appropriate for a
practical captcha.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate and analyse different aspects of
our system.First,we evaluate the usability, security, and com-
plexity of PiSHi based on real-world data whichwe collected
in our final experiments. Next, we discuss the automation of
the system, and our access control policies about of the algo-
rithms and databases.
5.1 Data collection for testing
In order to evaluate our final suggested captcha system with
the updating feature, we performed another experiment for
building our test data set. We collected data from 30 new
users (male and female, 18–50year old, university student
and staff). We presented them with PiSHi’s final interface,
as shown in Fig.1. As it can be seen, this interface includes
10 images in the scale of 200× 200 pixels. These 10 images
include eight images for user evaluation (two S, two M, two
H, and two V) and two images for updating the database.
These pictures are shown in random places on the web page.
The users could click on the top of each of them in any prefer-
able order. The border colour of the clicked images changes
in order to help the users with identifying the remained ones.
We asked each user to complete the presented captcha
challenge and repeat it for six times. We ended up with 180
different records at the end of the experiment. Similar to the
training data collection, we presented each user with a brief
description of the experiment. We also included a practice
round which we did not log. Another video file was clickable
as the system’s help in the case of any difficulty. As expected,
all users could easily understand the system and follow the
experiment.
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Fig. 12 Final credits distribution of human users
5.2 Usability metrics
Before reporting PiSHi’s response time and rate, we are
required to determine a minimum credit as the system’s
threshold for passing PiSHi’s challenges. For this we need to
find a balance between the usability of the system for human
users, and its security against random guessing attacks. Fig-
ure 12 shows the histogram of the users’ credits of our final
experiment, calculated from Eq. 2. As it can be seen, the
average credit of a human user is around 0.55 in our system.
On the other hand, according to our analysis in “Appendix”,
a random guessing attacker’s credit would be less than 0.1,
which is far away from an average human user. Hence, we
consider 0.1 as the minimum credit required by the system.
Based on this minimum required credit, the success rate of
PiSHi is 99.44%. In addition, users on average respond to a
sample challenge in 28.10 s, with an expiration time of 60s.
And as the final usability metric, PiSHi requires the users to
click once on each picture, which is an easy response mech-
anism for a captcha.
5.3 Security metrics
Random guessingAccording to our analysis in “Appendix”,
the random guessing attacker’s final credit would be less than
0.1. Hence, an attack programme would not be able to pass
the proposed captcha by random guessing, since it does not
get enough credit. We have designed the system in a way that
human users would benefit from their natural error produc-
tion approach when solving our suggested pictorial system.
This unique design reduces the chance of random guessing
attacks close to zero since random responses to the system
are distinctively different from human patterns.
Direct matching attacks The geometric transformation
algorithms, in combination with multiple rotation rounds,
produce a large search space by assigning different values to
different variables in runtime [16]. Hence, building a look-
up table and updating it according to the captcha database
is a complex and expensive procedure for the attacker. Note
that although we only used six geometric transformations
in this paper, they actually could be chosen from a much
wider set. Choosing a random3Dobjectwith randomsettings
in the runtime would even further improve the security of
the system. Therefore, we offer little support for an attacker
to recover the original pictures by searching the distorted
versions in a look-up table.
Reverse image search engines As mentioned in Sect.
1.3, evaluating the strength of image captchas against reverse
image search engines is a common approach to assessing the
security of a system.Here,weobserve the effectiveness of our
transformations against reverse matching by using reverse
image search engines including Google image search, and
Tineye.com. These selected reverse image search engines
are fast, web-based, and multi-purpose. We used Picasa10
and altered a few original pictures. After each modification,
we submitted the pictures to both Tineye and Google to see
if they can find any samples of the submitted pictures. For
example, we chose a horse picture and submitted it to the
mentioned engines and found out the number of findings.
Then, we distorted it in several ways: changing the colour,
light, angle, texture, size/ cut, etc. Figure 13 shows the results
of Tineye and Google for each effect. The effects were set
to 50% of the maximum possible amount allowed in Picasa.
The only exception is the circular cut which was done byMS
Paint.
As it can be seen in the picture, all changes—except
the geometric transformations—are recognisable by these
engines. We observed that these reverse search engines are
able to identify some of these effects such as resizing/cut-
ting, and colour better than others including light, rotation,
and texture change. However, the tested reverse image search
engines are absolutely incapable of finding any samples of
our distorted pictures produced by geometric transforma-
tions. As a result, the suggested geometric functions in PiSHi
are resilient against reverse image recognition methods and
prevent the attacker from mapping the distorted images to
their original ones.
Customised machine learning attacks As explained
before, upright orientation is a hard problem to learn for a
machine, especially when the content of the picture is par-
tially visible. In addition, machines need to solve another
hard problem which is finding the easier images to click ear-
lier and better.Moreover, continuously updating the database
makes security attacks even harder since the attacker needs
to construct a new look-up table, and/or to retrain the system
10 http://picasa.google.com/.
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Fig. 13 The results of reverse image search engines for different types of picture distortions
with the new images added to the database. Moreover, we
showed that available machine learning algorithms applied
in commercial image search engines are incapable of learning
the pictures used in PiSHi. Therefore, undertaking amachine
learning attack should prove difficult since PiSHi is based on
multiple hard problems, updates its database, and is robust
against the reverse search engines. However, a customised
machine learning attack which is designed for this captcha
is not implemented in this paper. These types of advanced
attacks are challenging and out of the scope of this work.
5.4 Complexity metrics
Asmentioned in Sect. 1.3, we suggest to evaluate complexity
metrics for a captcha system. Thesemetrics are server, client,
and communication complexities. In PiSHi, the server side
components use some pre-implemented functions in Mat-
lab which have linear computational complexity depending
on the size of the original picture. PiSHi sends 10 images
(200×200 pixs) to the clients, with an average size of 7.8kB
of each. The communication complexity would be even less
if the image size was decreased by an image processing algo-
rithm. The client returns eight clicked points to the server as
the captcha answer. Also, the clients do not need any extra
software, which makes PiSHi’s client complexity almost
zero.
5.5 Automation and availability of the system
components
All our suggested algorithms are automated. In addition, all
our algorithms and databases are public. Here, we discuss
how giving open access to different parts of our system will
not affect its security.
Algorithms We described our algorithms to be non-
deterministic, i.e. they produce different outputs for each
run. Selecting images from the web and from the image data-
bases is done randomly. The transformation algorithms use
randomvalues formultiple runtime variables. Also, the infer-
ence algorithm’s decision to pass or fail the user is based
on the user behaviour. Obviously, the values of the runtime
variables including the produced key image should be kept
private during the test. As the result of the non-determinism
of the algorithms, making them public should not impose any
security risks to the system.
Databases Both the picture databases (main and tem-
porary), and also the pattern database can be made public
without risking security. Exposing the original pictures to
attackers would not give them any advantages since these
pictures will be randomly distorted before being presented
to the users. The distortion algorithms are one way func-
tions. Therefore, the attacker will not be able to relate the
distorted picture to its original one. Knowing the patterns
without being able to identify the original picture of a dis-
torted one would not give the attacker any advantage either.
One might argue that mapping distorted images to the orig-
inal ones could be feasible by using direct matching attacks
or machine learning techniques. However, as we discussed
in the previous subsections, performing such attacks are not
straightforward on our proposed captcha.
6 Comparison
In this section,we compare PiSHiwith previous image-based
captchas as well as text-based captchas in terms of usability,
security, and complexity.
6.1 Image-based CAPTCHAs
We compare PiSHi with four image-based captchas; Micro-
softAsirra [4],What’sUPCAPTCHA[11], Sketcha [18], and
Multiple Seimcha [16]. Microsoft Assira is interesting for us
since it is the first image captcha which allows human mis-
takes in its design. The other threeworks are based on upright
orientation. Table 2 reports differentmetrics for PiSHi aswell
as these image captchas.
UsabilityAsmentionedbefore, PiSHi has a success rate of
99.44%which is the best result compared to others. Besides,
in terms of timing, it roughly counterbalances the rest. Asirra
[4] has a success rate of 99.96%when it presents the test two
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Table 2 Comparison between PiSHi and previous image captchas
Criteria PiSHi Asirra [4] What’s up
[11]
Sketcha
[18]
Multiple
seimcha [16]
Usability
Success rate 99.44% 83.4% 84% 88% 92%
Response time 28.10 s 15s NA 32.5 s 26s
Security
Hard problems Img. upside partial img.
decision making
animal rec. img. upside img. upside img. upside
partial img.
Ave. random 0%- min credit 0.39% (8 imgs) 0.009% 0.001% 0.009%
guessing attack of 0.1 (8 imgs) 0.024% (12 imgs) (3 imgs) (8 imgs) (8 imgs)
Reverse search engine resistance Yes No No Yes Yes
Database update Yes (credit-based) Yes No Yes (counting) No
Complexity
Server side Geometric functions None None 3D models to
drawings
geometric
functions
Server sending pics (pixel) 10 (200 * 200) 12 (350 * 166) 3 (180 * 180) 10 (240 * 240) 8 (280 * 210)
Client sending (per img) Single click Single click Rotated angle 1.5 clicks Single click
Extra software in client side No No Yes Yes No
more rounds to the user if he fails in the first round, though
this increases the response time to 45s.
Security PiSHi reduces the chance of an average random
guessing attack to zero which outperforms all others. It also
has some other security features including being based on
multiple hard problems, updating the databases, and being
resistant against image reverse search engines. The men-
tioned security features not only diminish all types of security
attacks, but also improve the usability of the system. In con-
trast, none of the previous works possess all the mentioned
security features together. They either don’t update the data-
bases or are weak against reverse image search engines.Most
of themeither use original images (Asirra), or someweak dis-
tortions such as cut and rotation (What’s up) which are recog-
nisable by search engines. Sketcha uses pen drawings which
can be still recognisable by search engines to some extent.
Though Sketcha pictures are based on 3D models which
makes it hard for the attacker to recover the original 3Dmod-
els. By comparison, our distorted images produced by geo-
metric functions are not recognisable by search engines at all.
Complexity In terms of server complexity, most of the
existing works and also PiSHi have transformation functions
in the server side. Also, the communication complexity is
roughly similar for all; however, the pixels of the pictures in
PiSHi are less than most of other works. PiSHi’s response
mechanism is extremely easy, requiring a single click per
image. It does not need any extra software on the client side
which is an advantage compared to Sketcha which needs a
programme to rotate images on the client side.
Fig. 14 reCAPTCHA ver1.0 variations a reCAPTCHA ver 1.0, dis-
torted characters, b reCAPTCHA ver 1.0, characters in picture
6.2 Text-based CAPTCHAs
Many different text-based captchas have been designed and
implemented over the years. Among them, reCAPTCHA [1]
is the most widely used captcha provider in the world being
used by more than half a million live websites11 including
companies such as Google and Facebook. reCAPTCHA has
two versions at the moment; ver 1.0 (text-based) and ver 2.0
(image-based). At the time of these experiments (October
2015) when testing reCAPTCHA ver 1.0 through Google
demo,12 it demonstrates two different types of text-based
captchas. We categorise these two variations based on the
11 http://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/reCAPTCHA.
12 www.google.com/recaptcha/demo/.
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Table 3 Usability comparison between PiSHi and reCAPTCHA
Works usability metrics PiSHi reCAPTCHA
(distorted characters)
reCAPTCHA
(characters in pictures)
Success rate 99.44% 88.67% 91.33%
Response time 28.10 s 24.47 s 7.2 s
Response mechanism Clicking pictures Typing characters (may include
numbers)
Typing numbers (may include
alphabetic characters)
type of the challenges and name them as distorted charac-
ters (Fig. 14a), and characters in pictures (Fig. 14b). In this
section, we compare our work with both variations.
UsabilityFor evaluating the usabilitymetrics,we asked30
users (male and female, aged 22–38 university student and
staff) to complete six reCAPTCHA tests by using Google
demo. The users were asked not to skip any of the given
challenges and provide answers to all of them. We recorded
the response time and the success rate per test. This Demo
provides random tests including both variations of ver 1.0.
We calculated the response times and success rates sepa-
rately for these two variations. The results are presented in
Table 3. As it can be seen, PiSHi’s success rate is higher than
both reCAPTCHA variations. However, its response time is
slightly longer than the distorted characters variation, and
much longer than the characters in pictures variation. The
reason is that the second variation normally presents users
with very short numbers, e.g. three digits, which in return
risks the security of the system.
In terms of the response mechanism, PiSHi requires users
to click on pictures, while they have to type multiple charac-
ters and numbers to pass reCAPTCHA. It has been agreed by
reCAPTCHA developers that typing a line of distorted text is
tediously harder than clicking pictures, specially for mobile
users [20].
Security In terms of direct matching attacks, strong text-
based captchas such as reCAPTCHA distorted characters
version are resilient, since they generally produce the chal-
lenge in real time by randomly choosing characters and
distorting them. To estimate the chance of random guessing,
distorted characters variation consists of two words: a ver-
ification word (reCAPTCHA server knows the answer) and
a read word (comes from an old book, which can be entered
incorrectly).13 On the verificationword, reCAPTCHAallows
an off by one error.Depending on the length of the verification
word, the random guessing chance changes. For example,
with a random word consisting of five alphabetical charac-
ters, the probability of the attack would be around 1
264
=
0.0002%. On the other hand, the strength of the characters
in the pictures variation depends on the number of charac-
13 http://code.google.com/p/recaptcha/wiki/FAQ.
ters that the user is presented with. As mentioned earlier, the
presented pictures mainly include number sequences, e.g. 3-
digit numbers; which yields to a probability of 1
103
= 0.1%
for a random guessing attack. As a result, PiSHi outperforms
both variations of text-based reCAPTCHA when encounters
a random guessing attack.
Furthermore, several researchers have tried to break text-
based captchas using machine learning techniques. There
exist different works such as [8,9,13,21] in which demon-
strate that overcoming text-based captchas by automated
programmes is indeed practical. For example, Starostenko et
al. [21] show that their method can successfully attack text-
based reCAPTCHA in only 0.49 s. Theirmethod can segment
the shown characters in 75.9% cases and recognise them
with 95% accuracy. As a matter of fact, Google acknowl-
edged these sorts of attacks in December 2014, stating that
the most difficult variants of distorted texts can be solved
with 99.8% accuracy by advanced methods [20]. Most of
these methods adopt advanced image processing algorithms
for, first, segmenting the noisy characters in the picture, and
then identifying them in each segment [21]. In terms of com-
parison, thesemethods are not applicable to an image captcha
such as PiSHi.
Complexity Almost all text-based captchas have some
sort of server side transformations in order to produce the
final pictures. The pictures sent to the clients could be
either black and white, or coloured. And the client returns
the typed characters to the server. By comparison, PiSHi
counterbalances a typical text-based captcha since it uses
transformations in the server side, sends coloured pictures,
and return click points to the server.
Overall, the good performance of our system, in combina-
tion to its security features, and its scalability offer the ideas
in this paper to be considered in practical captcha systems.
7 Discussions
Applications In this work, we proposed the use of the users’
interaction models with pictorial systems as a new approach
to be considered when designing security systems. As a
proof-of-concept of the idea, we implemented and evalu-
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ated PiSHi which is an image captcha. We believe analysing
human interaction patterns when encountering pictorial sys-
tems could be used for other purposes such as identification
of age, gender, profession, etc. For example, an online age
recognition system could be really helpful in multiple ways
such as preventing children to have access to certain online
contents when their parents are not monitoring them. More-
over, we propose our system to be used in mobile devices.
The simple response mechanism of PiSHi makes it a mobile-
friendly service. Tapping on the touch screen is much easier
than other methods used in other captchas, e.g. typing char-
acters, or choosing labels from a list.
Patterns We suggested five different factors to include
in our model, and we showed their effectiveness in Sect. 5.
However, some of them might be improvable. For exam-
ple, response time may not contribute to the system security,
since it is easy for the attacker to identify and fabricate the
best response time. However, we estimated that even if the
attacker gets the highest credit in this factor, his final credit
would be 0.1273 (see “Appendix”), which is still far from the
user average credit (0.5492). Moreover, our suggested pat-
terns have been built by presenting eight pictures to the users,
while the final system includes two extra pictures for updat-
ing the database. The new presentation of the system might
affect the patterns.While PiSHi is performing at a high accu-
racy using the current patterns, updating them according to
the final presentation of the systemmight further improve the
results. Also, other strategies such as addingweighting based
on the importance of some particular factorsmay improve the
system performance even more.
Users We tried to cover a wide range of ages and
backgrounds of users when performing our user studies in
different phases of this project. Yet, a larger-scale experi-
ments in a longer time would observe the suggested ideas
more accurately. By performing the experiments in a longer
time and with a wider set, we might find new patterns due to
possible changes in user behaviour after using the system for
a while. While such considerations are valid, we believe that
they would not invalidate the general results. Furthermore,
this paper presents a proof-of-concept of PiSHi in order to
demonstrate the feasibility of including human behavioural
analysis in a captcha design. For a commercial version of the
proposed system, more comprehensive studies are required.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented PiSHi (pictorial intelligent system
for human identification) as a new image captcha. Over-
all, our captcha is the first which models human interaction
patterns by considering human users errors when working
with a pictorial system. We designed our system based on
these behavioural patterns and granted the users credits based
on comparing their entire engagement with the system with
these patterns. These credits were used in order to passing
or failing the users, as well as updating the captcha data-
base. PiSHi has a high success rate (99.44%), is easy for
human users to interact, and is secure against random guess-
ing attacks and reverse image search engines.
As future work, we would like to improve our extracted
patterns by applying more advanced pattern recognition
methods. We also aim to extend PiSHi’s ideas to other con-
texts such as age recognition. We are also interested in
discovering and modelling other hard concepts for machines
such as beauty. And finally, as a reverse approach, we are
interested in finding problems which are easy for machines
and hard for humans, such as optical illusions, to use in a
captcha.
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Appendix: Random guessing attack analysis
In this section, first we calculate the credit of an average
random guessing attack according to the extracted patterns
presented in Sect. 3.2. Next, we present the details of an
experimental test to simulate multiple random guessing
attacks and present the credit distribution gained by these
attacks.
Average attacker’s credit
PNo: Based on our analysis, after distorting the original pic-
tures, on average, 17.5% of the output pictures is the answer
area visible to the users. Hence, a random click would be
correct in 17.5% of the cases; equal to 1.4 images out of
eight. As it can be seen in Fig. 6, the probabilities of the
credit of clicking on one and two correct pictures are equal
to 0 and 0.00645, respectively. A linear average, which is
equal to 0.0033 (rounded up), would give us an approximate
estimation of the attacker’s credit in this pattern.
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Table 4 Random attacker’s credit from PF-Pos-H R
Click no. ave(Pass) ave(Fail) PPos-H Rn
1 0.2113 0.0387 0.0689
2 0.2161 0.0339 0.0657
3 0.2097 0.0403 0.0699
4 0.2145 0.0355 0.0668
5 0.1903 0.0597 0.0825
6 0.1952 0.0548 0.07937
7 0.1839 0.0661 0.08671
8 0.1726 0.0774 0.09406
Chance 0.175 0.825
PF-Pos-H R(ran) = 8√PPos-H Rn = 0.0761
Table 5 Final credit estimation for an average random guessing attack
Px Value
PNo 0.0033
PH R-No 0.0200
PCli-order 0.0526
PF-Pos-H R 0.0761
PT 0.0166
CFinal (ran) = 5
√
Px
C = 0.0839
PH R-No: As we explained before, the probability of some
of the less probable cases are not shown in Fig. 7 since there
were either no, or few samples in our data set. For example,
in the categories of 1 and 2 correct answers, most of the cases
did not happen in our experiments. Therefore, as explained
in Sect. 3.2.2, we assign the lowest nonzero value of the
corresponding function, which is 0.0200, to the attacker.
PCli-order : In order to calculate the output of this function
for the attacker, we should divide the sum of the function
amounts, which is 1, into the number of inputs, which is 19.
Hence, an attacker would get 119 = 0.0526 as its credit in
this pattern.
PF-Pos-H R : For an attacker, the chance of clicking on dif-
ferent categories of images is equal to 0.25. As mentioned
earlier, an attacker would click a picture from whatever cat-
egory (S, M, H, V) correctly with a possibility of 17.5%.
Accordingly, he clicks the picture incorrectly with a chance
of 82.5%. Hence, we are able to estimate the credit for each
click in this pattern by applying a weighted sum equation:
PPos-H Rn(ran) = 0.175 × Ave(PPos-H Rn(X − Pass))
+0.825 × Ave(PPos-H Rn(X − Fail))
Fig. 15 Histograms of final credits of simulated random guessing
attacks vs. human users
where n is the click number, X is the representative of all
category of images (S, M, H, and V), and ave is a sim-
ple mean function. Table 4 calculates the attacker’s final
credit obtained from this pattern according to Eq. 1. As it
can be seen, an average attacker would score 0.0799 in this
pattern.
PT : In terms of response time, a machine is much faster
than a human user. Therefore, we consider the amount of
the first category −8 to 10s and less—which is 0.017 as the
credit of this pattern to the attacker.
Final credit (CFinal ):As presented inTable 5, and accord-
ing to Eq. 2, the attacker will get around 0.0839 as its final
credit by a random guess attack. Distinctively, the attackers’
final credit is too low comparing to an average human user
(0.55).
Attack simulation
In this experiment, we wrote a Matlab code in order to simu-
late 180 different random guessing attacks on our system. As
it can be seen, the code randomly selects an unseen picture
from different categories of difficulties. Then, it randomly
calculates a response for this picture according to its chance;
17.5% correctly clicked, 82.5% wrongly clicked. Next, the
code saves the sequences of all eight pictures, and if they
have been clicked correctly or wrongly in the answer array.
Finally, another module is called to calculate the final credits
of all randomly produced tests according to our patterns.
A histogram of these final credits is presented in Fig. 15.
As it can be seen, the credit associated with the peak of this
histogram is slightly less than the credit of our estimation of
an average attacker. The reason is that in the case of click-
ing none of the images correctly, the system will give a final
credit of 0 to the attacker. This case happened in this simu-
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lated experiment several times, while we did not have such
data in our patterns for our human users. If we compare this
fit with the one presented in Fig. 12 for human users credits,
we discover that the average credit for an average human user
(0.55) is far away from the machine’s credit (simulated aver-
age result: 0.025, estimated average result: 0.084). This helps
us to define a proper threshold for our system as explained
in Sect. 5.
1 for j= 1: 180
t= zeros(8); tc= 1; flagg= 0;
3 for i= 1:8
flagg= 0;
5 while( flagg == 0)
b= floor(1+8∗rand(1 ,1));
7 result = find ( t == b) ;
i f result> 0 flagg= 0;
9 else flagg= 1;
end
11 end
t ( tc)= b; tc= tc+1;
13 c= (100∗rand(1 ,1));
i f c< 17.5 anss= 1;
15 else anss= 0;
end
17 Ansswer( j , i ,1)= mod(b,4)+1;
Ansswer( j , i ,2)= anss;
19 end
end
21 Credit = FinalCredit (Ansswer)
h i s t f i t (Credit )
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